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PROBATION IN TE CRIMINAL COURT
OF BALTIMORE CITY
By H. B. Mu-rrE*
Probation is an outgrowth of the common-law practice
of the suspended sentence which, in turn, probably had its
origin in some ancient and medieval practice of amnesty
or grace; e.g., "benefit of clergy", "right of sanctuary", and
"judicial reprieve".1 The institution of probation in our
modern system of criminal jurisprudence implements our
present day theory of correction. Management of a crimi-
nal has always posed a dilemma in regard to the ultimate
end to be accomplished. "Correction" has taken on many
motives throughout history, but it suffices to say that our
present day thinking on the subject puts new emphasis on
the redemption of the individual.2 Underneath it all,
society will eventually be the real beneficiary if the in-
dividual is benefited so that he becomes a useful member
of society rather than an habitual criminal.8 Probation
plays a most important role in the field of crime control and
correction, and it can be said that probation is a non-puni-
tive method of treating criminal offenders within the frame-
work of a system, which, in general, is punitive.4 Statutory
authorization for probation is a departure from strict ad-
herence to law, since constitutionally, there is no right to
probation, and a prisoner cannot insist on terms or strike a
bargain.5 The granting of probation, aside from being an
act of clemency extended to one who has committed a
crime, is also in substance and effect a bargain made by
the people, through legislation and courts, with the male-
factor.6 A broader definition of probation might be stated
as follows:
"Probation is the status of a convicted offender dur-
ing a period of suspension of the sentence in which he
is given liberty conditioned on his good behavior and in
*Probation Officer of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City; B.S.,
University of Maryland, 1953; LL.B., University of Maryland, School of
Law, 1957.1BARNms AND TmNs, NEw HoRizoNs IN CIMINOLOGY (1951), 758-775.
Also see ATroaNEY GENRAL'S SUnvEX OF RzrfA.sE PaocnuRas (1939),
Volume 2, Ch. I.
'See TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY CORamcON (1951 ed.), 3-17; see also
STRAHORN, PaORATIoN, PAROLE, AND LGAL RuLES OF GUILT, 26 J. Cr. Law
and Cr. (1935) 168.
'People v. Molz, 415 Ill. 183, 113 N. E. 2d 314 (1953).
' SUTHERLAND, PaRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (4th ed.), 381-411.
Supra, n. 3.
0 People v. Johnson, 134 Cal. App. 2d 140, 285 P. 2d 74 (1955).
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which the state by personal supervision attempts to
assist him to maintain good behavior",7
or:
"[Probation is] to provide an individualized pro-
gram offering a young or unhardened offender an
opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institu-
tional confinement under the tutelage of a probation
official and under the continuing power of the Court
to impose institutional punishment for his original
offense in the event that he abuse this opportunity."'
The terms probation and parole, although dealing in the
same area, are not one and the same. There exists an im-
portant and definite distinction between the two, in that
probation is afforded to an individual without his having
to suffer incarceration, and parole is afforded to an in-
dividual who has suffered a period of incarceration; the
former is a judicial power while the latter is an executive
or administrative power. Both, however, are intended to
be a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks
to society and to afford the unfortunate another opportunity
by clemency."0
The first probation law in this country was passed in
Massachusetts in 1878, but the practice of probation was
carried on informally much earlier. It is noted that as early
as 1831, a member of the Boston judiciary, Judge Peter 0.
Thatcher, placed young offenders under supervision with-
out incarceration. But perhaps probation as we know it
can probably be attributed to John Augustus, a shoemaker
in Boston who informally began probationary services."
Many other states soon followed the New England begin-
ning and passed similar statutes. Maryland became the
second state to adopt the principle and philosophy of pro-
bation. 2 In 1894, the Maryland legislature passed an act
authorizing the Criminal Courts of the state to suspend
sentence and release offenders upon such terms as the Court
might deem proper."3 This act, however, created no pro-
bation department to oversee supervision of released
offenders. Hence, judges were compelled to impose upon
7 Supra, n. 4.8 Roberts v. United States, 320 U. S. 264, 272 (1943). Parenthetical ma-
terial supplied.
9 See Strahorn, 8upra, n. 2.1 0 Korematsu v. United States, 319 U. S. 432 (1943).
Op. cit, 8upra, n. 1.
Stuckert, Report of the Probation Department of the Supreme Bench
for the Decade: 1929-1938.
Ch. 402, Acts of 1894.
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the hospitality and good offices of the Prisoners Aid Asso-
ciation to supervise the conduct of persons released on pro-
bation. However, in 1931, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City recommended legislation to establish a probation de-
partment under the management of and responsible to the
Supreme Bench; the recommended legislation was adopted
by the passage of Chapter 132, Acts of 1931.11 Authoriza-
tion for the Probation Department of the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore City can presently be found in the Charter &
Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (Flack, 1949), Sec-
tions 276-288. The department, headed by a Director of
Probation, is administratively divided into two parts, con-
sisting of the Domestic Relations Division - dealing with
cases of non-support, bastardy, alimony, and the like, and
the Criminal Division - dealing with general criminal
cases in the narrow sense. This article is limited to a dis-
cussion of that latter division.
The Criminal Division of the Probation Department of
the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City provides services
for investigation and supervision of offenders appearing in
the three parts of the Criminal Court of Baltimore City,
with special emphasis on the Youth Court (Part III).
Presently, the personnel of the Criminal Division consists
of two court representatives, present throughout all Youth
Court sessions, six investigating officers, and nine super-
vising officers, with offices located in the Baltimore City
Court House. The staff of the department is appointed by
the Supreme Bench, being selected after competitive
examination.
Investigation, an essential and important function of any
probation department, provides background material from
which the judiciary may gain insight and better under-
standing of a criminal case, so as to permit "justice" under
the circumstances. Embodied in all investigation reports
is certain basic background data: e.g., family history, em-
ployment record, educational achievements, previous crimi-
nal record, etc. The report also contains, as well as a narra-
tive summary of the background data, circumstances of the
instant offense and individual observations, concluding in
a recommendation or suggestion as formulated by the in-
vestigating officer. 15 Very often, in conjunction with pro-
bation investigations, the Medical Department of the
Supreme Bench will submit psychiatric or general reports,
"Report of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City for the year ending
January, 1931.
15 ATroRNzY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF REILEASE PROCEDURES (1939), Chs. V
and VI.
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thus making more technical information available to the
Court. Needless to say, this added service to the Court is
of utmost importance, and rounds out the scope of investi-
gatorial services.
Investigations are made only at the discretion of the
Court and are not binding as to the judgment in a particular
case.16 Formal written investigations are essentially divided
into three types: Pre-Trial, Pre-sentence, and Post Sen-
tence. It should be noted that the Pre-Trial Investigation
is limited in use and only recommended in special circum-
stances; 7 e.g., where agreement is made between defense
counsel and the Court that a plea of guilty will be forth-
coming; the basic reason, among others, for such limited
use should be clear, for under our principles of criminal
jurisprudence, the facts incidental to the commission of a
crime have no bearing on the finding of a verdict. In some
instances, investigations are done orally where the Court
is desirous of a speedy disposition, and in such situations,
the Court representatives of the probation department
make an "on the spot" investigation, usually, the same day
of the trial. This latter type of inquiry is necessarily quite
limited in scope. From time to time, the Court may require
information concerning some specific facts; e.g., a proba-
tion officer may be directed to investigate and report on the
physical conditions of an area where an alleged crime has
occurred.
To assist in the investigation of criminal cases, officers
undertaking this duty can utilize legal processes, such as
the subpoena duces tecum, to aid them in procuring in-
formation from sometimes reluctant sources. Completed
investigations and, as a matter of fact, all information and
records of the probation department, are given quasi-
judicial protection by way of privilege."5
6 People v. Molz, 415 Ill. 183, 113 N. H. 2d 314 (1953).
" In 1956, 12 Pre-Trial Investigations were made as compared to 340 Pre-
Sentence Investigations and 55 Post Sentence Investigations.
§281 of the CHARnm AND P. L. L. oF BALTIMomn CiTy (Flack, 1949), pro-
vides in part that:
"All information and data obtained in the discharge of official duty
by any probation worker or appointee of the Supreme Bench serving
in the Probation Department, from whatsoever source the same shall
be obtained shall be privileged information and shall not be receivable
as evidence in a tribunal or court... and shall not be disclosed directly
or indirectly outside the membership of the Probation Department in
the discharge of his official duties to any one other than to a member
or members of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, unless and until
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City or by any
member thereof."
It is the general opinion of members of the Supreme Bench that informa-
tion in the possession of the probation department should not be used in
any collateral issue.
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The question of "Due Process of Law" in reference to
probation investigation has often arisen,"9 but probably the
Supreme Court of the United States has cleared up this
problem to a large extent by holding, in recent litigation,
that a conviction is not void under the "Due Process" clause
solely by reason of the fact that the Court before imposing
sentence had considered additional information obtained
through the Court's probation department and through
other sources.2  Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
stated that under the practice of individualizing punish-
ments investigational techniques have been given an im-
portant role. Probation workers making reports of their
investigation have not been trained to prosecute but to aid
offenders. Their reports have been given a high value by
conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the
best available information rather than on guess work and
inadequate information. Justice Murphy, in the dissent,
held that the lower court's decision had deprived a man of
life in reliance on material made available to it on proba-
tion reports consisting almost entirely of evidence that
would have been inadmissible at the trial - irrelevant
facts, records of other crimes, and hearsay evidence,
none of which had been subject to the scrutiny of the de-
fendant. Authority also has it, that where the judge pro-
ceeds to fix a sentence in a criminal case, after a plea of
guilty or verdict of guilty, his inquiry is not limited by the
rules applicable to a jury trial, and he may consider cir-
cumstances that should effect a mitigation or aggravation
of the penalty.2 '
The Maryland Court of Appeals has also ruled recently
in this area and has held that after a conviction, the Court
could exercise a broad discretion in the use of evidence to
assist it in determining the kind and extent of punishment
to impose within the limits fixed by law. Before imposing
a sentence, a judge may consider information concerning
a person's reputation, past offenses, health, habits, mental
and moral propensities, social background, and any other
matters that a judge ought to have before him in determin-
ing the kind of sentence that should be imposed. Also,
information, which might influence the Court's judg-
ment, obtained in a pre-sentence investigation but not re-
ceived from the defendant himself or not given in his
"1 See Rubin, Probation d Due Procem, Focus Magazine, Vol. 31, No. 2
(1952).
21 Williams v. New York, 837 U. S. 241 (1949).
21 WiaMos ON EVIDNCm (3rd ed.) 25, §4(8).
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presence should be called to the accused's attention or to
the attention of his counsel so that he may be afforded an
opportunity to refute or discredit it. The procedure in the
sentencing process is not the same as that in the trial process
and the sentencing judge may consider information even
though obtained outside the courtroom from persons whom
the defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross
examine.2 The Judges of the Baltimore City Criminal
Court have made it a practice to make available to defense
counsel investigation reports, although no copy is given.
The Baltimore City Criminal Court besides having the
right to suspend a sentence generally, provides for proba-
tion under the following terms: probation before conviction
(similar to probation without verdict),23 conditional sus-
pension of sentence, and probation in the ordinary sense.
Probation before conviction is a relatively recent innova-
tion intended to bring legal and social philosophy closer
together in the area of rehabilitation of criminal offenders.
The practice has been to provide the aforementioned type
of probation to individuals whom the Court feels are de-
serving of some protection from the stigma of a criminal
record. However, in receiving this probation, the indi-
vidual "consents" to abide by such conditions as those im-
posed in probation in the ordinary course."' It is important
to note that probation before conviction is not intended to
be a compromise verdict.
The conditional suspension of sentence is utilized where
no supervision per se is ordered other than the "super-
vised" collection of some financial obligation: e.g., a fine,
court costs, restitution, etc. 5 The manner of payment may
be specifically set out in the order or left to the sound judg-
ment of the probation department subject to judicial ap-
proval. It might be added that the probation department
has an extensive collection and accounting department to
facilitate such matters. The order conditionally suspending
the sentence contains also the general proviso requiring of
the defendant "good behavior". This is distinguished from
what might be determined the ordinary rules of probation,
where acts less than a conviction of a subsequent offense
can amount to a violation of probation, while evidently, it
2Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A. 2d 570 (1952). The Court was con-
cerned with a Pre-Sentence Medical Report, but the implication would
appear to be the same for Pre-Sentence Probation Reports.
"Supra, n. 18, §277.
24 Ibid.
2The conditional suspension of sentence can be provided for other pur-
poses; e.g., exile requirements, but they would not fall within the purview
of the Jurisdiction of the probation department.
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would appear, only a subsequent offense could breach the
"good behavior" clause.20
Probation in the ordinary sense, as distinguished from
probation before conviction, is received by an offender after
a verdict or plea of guilty has been entered, and the im-
position of sentence is suspended. The defendant is there-
after placed in the custody of the probation department for
supervision during the term specified. There apparently
exists no right to place a defendant under an order of an
indefinite period of probation,27 and in conformity with this
rule, Section 279 of the Charter and Public Local Laws of
Baltimore City (Flack, 1949), provides that the period of pro-
bation shall not exceed the maximum sentence of imprison-
ment to which such person may be sentenced on any count
of the indictment or charge with which he stands accused,
or, in any case, the period of probation shall not exceed five
years. Extensions of the original period of probation, also
authorized by the aforementioned statute, may be accom-
plished by petitioning for such extension, with the reasons
therefore set out in the petition. The practice for securing
such an extension has been by the submission of a petition
to the Court by a probation officer without requiring the
appearance of the defendant. Some comment has been
made that the defendant should be allowed to appear and
represent his position on such an extension. But, in most
instances, the extensions are applied for in behalf of the
defendants; e.g., to provide for further time to enable com-
pliance with an order requiring payment by way of restitu-
tion. However, the noted comment might be applicable
where the extension is sought counter to the defendant's
wishes.2"
The next question that presents itself concerns the
period within which a Court may suspend a sentence and
place a defendant on probation. In 1942, Judge Eugene
O'Dunne wrote an extensive opinion, in the case of State v.
See State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922), and cited in
State v. Millner, 240 N. C. 602, 83 S. E. 2d 546 (1954).1 See Horton v. United States, 151 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir., 1945).
U §278 of the CHARTER & P. L. L. or BALTIMORE CITY, supra, n. 18, provides
that after notice to the probationer and the full opportunity to be heard,
the Court may alter, enlarge, modify or change any condition of suspension
of sentence or probation. §279 of the same act provides that the Court,
from time to time may continue to extend the period of probation and
suspension of sentence. This latter section makes no mention of the right
to notice and a hearing when probation is extended.
However, from the reasoning in the case of Palumbo v. Pepersack, The
Daily Record, Jan. 7, 1957, it could be implied that §278 is broad enough
to provide authorization for notice and hearing upon application for a
change in the original order of probation.
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Pettis and Smith,29 in justification of his reduction of a sen-
tence after the term of Court in which such sentence had
been rendered had expired. Eight years later, however,
the Court of Appeals in Czaplinski v. Warden,"° ruling on
this problem, held that the power of a criminal court to
modify its sentence expires at the end of the term of court
in which rendered. In dictum, it was inferred that an at-
tempt to modify a sentence after the term of court had
expired would be an invasion of the parole power of the
Executive.3 As a result of this decision, the Maryland legis-
lature in 1951 passed a law (Sec. 277) providing that the
judges in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City may at any
time before the expiration of sentence suspend such sen-
tence and provide for probation. 2 A rule was proposed to
the Court of Appeals in the same year and provided that
a criminal sentence may be reduced within thirty days
(changed to ninety days in 1952) after the sentence was
imposed, but [by Sec. (d)] that such rule should not limit
the power of the Criminal Court of Baltimore under Section
277 as amended by the Laws of 1951.18 However, in adopting
this rule, the Court of Appeals left out Section (d). 1 Even
in the absence of the deleted provision, however, in accord-
ance with generally accepted rules of construction, by hold-
ing that a suspension of sentence is not a reduction thereof,
the two may be resolved to be not in conflict.
The problem then arises as to whether section 277 of the
Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (Flack,
1949), as amended by Chapter 529 of the laws of 1951, is
The Daily Record, May 26, 1942.
196 Md. 654, 75 A. 2d 766 (1950).
InFederal authority also has it that after a sentence has been imposed and
a defendant has begun serving his sentence, he is under the control of the
executive branch of the government and the judicial branch should there-
after not attempt to exercise power properly exercised by the parole board.
Mann v. United States, 218 F. 2d 936 (4th Cir., 1955).
2MD. LAWS 1951, Ch. 529, amending §277. The preamble to this statute
stated as follows:
"WHERm.s, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently held in the
case of State ex rel. Czaplinski v. Warden, 75 A. (2) 766, that the
power of a Criminal Court to modify sentence in criminal cases expires
with the end of the term of court in which rendered, and the decision
has cast doubt upon the authority of the Criminal Court of Baltimore
City to suspend sentence and grant probation to offenders after the
lapse of the term, and
"WH EAS, it is desirable in the opinion of the legislature that the
Judges of the Criminal Court of Baltimore shall have the power and
authority . . ."
8See, Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, June 12, 1951, and
draft of Rule thereto attached.
,1 The Daily Record, July 2, 1952, now Maryland Rules of Procedure
(1956), Rule 744(c).
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violative of the principle of separation of powers, in light
of the dictum in Czaplinski v. Warden.8 5 In view of section
60 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution, the answer
would appear to be in the negative.8
The general rules governing the conduct of offenders
placed on probation are of standard form as decided upon
by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City and are as follows:
1. The defendant shall report to his probation officer
as directed.
2. The defendant shall not leave the City of Baltimore
without consent of the Court, nor change his ad-
dress within the city without first obtaining the ap-
proval of his probation officer.
3. The defendant shall maintain regular employment
and (when applicable) adequately support his de-
pendents.
4. The defendant shall conduct himself in a law-abid-
ing manner and shall avoid places and associations
of an undesirable character.
5. The defendant shall report in response to any
notice served upon him by the probation depart-
ment or the police department.
6. The defendant shall make the following payments
(when applicable) ."
In addition to the above-stated general conditions, the
Court has the authority to provide for additional require-
ments where and when necessary; e.g., abstinence from
alcohol, psychiatric treatment, etc.8" The Court may also
alter, modify, or change any condition of the suspended
sentence or probation during the course of supervision. 9
A criminal offender is not entitled to release on proba-
tion as a matter of right but such decision rests in the
1 Supra, n. 30, 664.
The constitutional provision is as follows:
"The General Assembly of Maryland shall have the power to provide
by suitable general enactment (a) for the suspension of sentence by
the Court in criminal cases; (b) for any form of the indeterminate
sentence in criminal cases, and (c) for 'the release upon parole in what-
ever manner the General Assembly may prescribe, of convicts im-
prisoned under sentence of crimes."
A fine, court costs, and restitution are examples of financial obligations
collectible under the probation order.
CHARTn AND P. L. L. op BALTiRmo CiTy (Flack, 1949), §277.
lbid, §278.
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sound discretion of the Court,4" and refusal to suspend a
sentence is not reviewable except in the case of arbitrary
abuse of discretion.4 The Court in granting probation seeks
to provide a deserving individual with another opportunity
to adjust in his community, which is afforded with assist-
ance through supervision. Suspension of sentence without
supervision, from the theoretical point of view, is not pro-
bation.42 The supervision of a probationer is delegated to
a probation officer, whose responsibility it becomes to aid
the offender while seeing that the conditions of probation
are fulfilled.' This is indeed a difficult and sometimes ex-
acting task, requiring sufficient training and experience
plus human understanding and tact. A probation officer
may be called upon to assist, advise, or solve problems in a
multitude of areas; e.g., domestic problems, financial crises,
employment and educational problems, etc. He, the proba-
tion officer, generally follows a course of supervision best
suited to individual circumstances. The expression of the
Supreme Court of the United States that probation officers
have not been trained to prosecute but to aid offenders," is
recognition from the highest court of the land of the task
predominant in the minds of these officers. But, this pre-
dominant task must sometime give way to a further re-
sponsibility; i.e., protection of the community. By and
large, a sufficient number of individuals profit from proba-
tion, and from a community's point of view, probation has
paid for itself. There are those, however, who cannot adjust
even with the opportunity of probation, and they must be
proceeded against to protect the community.45 It is on such
an occasion that the probation officer must act as a "police
agency" for the Court.
The Court, on written charges preferred under oath, of
violation of any conditions of probation, may issue a war-
rant or notice requiring the traverser, probationer, or per-
son accused to be brought before, or appear before said
court, to answer such charges of violation.", Strikingly
enough, there is a conflict among jurisdictions as to whether
there exists a constitutional right to notice and hearing
'*People v. Marks, 340 Mich. 495, 65 N. W. 2d 698 (1954), and State ex
rel. Stauffer v. Wright, 192 Md. 715, 64 A. 2d 125 (1949).
1 Mann v. United States, supra, n. 31.
12 SUTHx.&1D, PmlNcrPLrs or CwImINOLOGY (4th ed.) 381-411.
" In 1956, 1,257 cases were under supervision and of this figure 700 were
new cases received in that year. The 700 new cases were divided as follows:
355 Youths and 345 Adults.
"Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 249 (1949).
5 In 1956, 83 bench warrants were issued, while 225 police notices were
issued.
10 Supra, n. 38, 1279.
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preceding revocation of probation or parole.4 7 Justice
Cardozo, speaking for the majority in Escoe v. Zerbst,4s
expressly rejected the contention that such a privilege has
a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute.
Also, the question of constitutional right to a hearing
has had an uncertain course in Maryland. The Court of
Appeals, in dealing with Wright v. Herzog,49 stated that no
right to a hearing existed under the statute or the state
constitution, unless demanded by due process of law, and
held that absent any allegation or showing of arbitrary
action by the Governor (the parolee did not deny his viola-
tions) no constitutional violation existed. The Court indi-
cated that arbitrary action, without hearing, could be chal-
lenged by habeas corpus upon allegation and proof of arbi-
trary and capricious action. Thereafter, in Murray v. Swen-
son,50 the Court ruled that a defendant in a revocation of
parole (and by implication, probation) proceeding must
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself,
and in Swan v. State and Hite v. State,5 the Court has
flatly stated that a hearing is a requisite of "due process of
law". In a very recent nisi prius case,52 Judge Michael J.
Manley cited the annotation in 29 A. L. R. 2d 1074 at 1124
as stating that Maryland cases, "are in direct conflict in
principle, as a result of the Court's failure in the Swenson
case to distinguish between 'procedural' and 'substantive'
due process".
It is possible that some of the difficulty is encountered
because of the tendency to follow the traditional approach
of revocation of license proceedings that no hearing is re-
quired for revocation of a "privilege" but is if a "right" is
involved,53 and at least an early tendency to think of con-
ditional pardons, paroles, and probation as constituting only
"privileges".54 Actually, attempting to categorize between
"rights" and "privileges" doesn't help unless it is ap-
proached from the two-fold angle of: (1) Is the claimed
right or privilege of such personal or monetary value to
the individual that fundamental requisites of fair play re-
4729 A. L. R. (2d) 1074-1140.
"295 U. S. 490 (1935).
"182 Md. 316, 34 A. 2d 460 (1943).
50196 Md. 222, 76 A. 2d 150 (1950).
200 Md. 420, 90 A. 2d 690 (1952) ; 198 Md. 602, 84 A. 2d 899 (1951).
2Palumbo v. Pepersack, The Daily Record, Jan. 7, 1957. The case arose
under a habeas corpus proceeding for the denial of the parole board to
allow the petitioner to be represented by counsel at a parole revocation
hearing. Judge Manley held for the petitioner.
m DAVIs, ADMINIsTRAIvE LAW (1951) 246-254.
"Ibid, 249, Wright v. Herzog, supra, n. 49.
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quire that it be not forfeited without a hearing (in which
case it should be a "right") and (2) Should the scope of the
hearing extend to all matters of law and of fact or only
those matters which a trial type hearing may be particu-
larly helpful in solving?55 The Maryland Courts in the area
of pardons, parole, and probation, would seem to have got-
ten the desirable result of requiring a hearing on the fact
of breach of condition before revocation. This result can
be supported most clearly and simply by reasoning which
directly recognizes that whether labeled "rights" or "privi-
leges" these several means of seeking to rehabilitate crimi-
nals involve vital interests of the criminal in every case,
which should not be destroyed without affording the person
involved the opportunity of a hearing, and that like all
rights of substance they are entitled to constitutional pro-
tections as to fair hearing before forfeiture.
The practice in Baltimore City in revocation of proba-
tion proceedings has been to provide notice and hearing
with the "right" to be represented by counsel. Judge
Manley, in his opinion in the Palumbo case,56 notes, as
follows:
".... that in order to alter or modify or add to the
conditions of probation, the probationer must be given
an opportunity to be heard either in person or by coun-
sel. There is no provision in Section 279 relating to
the revocation of probation that specifically gives the
probationer the right to have counsel, but it would
hardly be contended by anyone that the probationer
would not have such right even though none is pro-
vided for in the statute, and even though such a judicial
proceeding is technically not a criminal prosecution."
Generally, in revocation proceedings in Baltimore City,
notice is given by way of summons served by the Police
Department, and these proceedings are commonly referred
to as "Police Notice Hearings". Bench Warrants are issued
where it is deemed necessary to retain a defendant in cus-
tody, prior to a hearing.57 Although a defendant, in revoca-
tion proceedings, must be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to defend himself against the charge that he has
s Ibid. And see particularly, Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607,
609 (1947) ; Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. 2d 982, 132 A. L. R. 1241 (6th
Cir., 1941). Also see, Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or Pardon
Without Hearing, 32 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 531, 532 (1942).
wfSupra, n. 52.
'Where the circumstances require it, there is authority for allowing the
retention and custody of a probationer prior 'to the issuance of a warrant.
See Ex parte Longoria, 161 Tex. Cr. Rep. 142, 275 S. W. 2d 810 (1955).
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violated his conditions of probation, he is not entitled to a
trial in any strict or formal sense.58 Such hearings are
usually held before the presiding judge of Part III of the
Criminal Court of Baltimore, and one day each week has
been set aside for these proceedings, taking place before
the regular assignment.59 The manner and form of the pro-
ceedings for revocation of probation have been either
formal or informal, at the discretion of the trial judge.60
The issue of whether a defendant has the "right" to be
represented by his own counsel has heretofore been con-
sidered; whether or not a defendant is entitled to counsel
at the expense of the state is another problem. The answer
to this would appear to be dependent upon what standards
must be met in order to satisfy the substantive require-
ments of "due process of law"."
The rules of evidence in the aforementioned proceedings
would appear not subject to the formal regulations re-
quired in the trial of a criminal offense, and this proposi-
tion can be supported by implication from the decisions in
Williams v. New York62 and Driver v. State,6 3 but, having
the right to weigh any testimony, the Court still has a duty
to preserve and protect the basic rights of an individual.
The evidence presented need not establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as in criminal offenses, but all that is re-
quired is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy
the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not mea-
sured up to the standards required by the conditions of
probation. 4
Testimony is begun by the presentation of the probation
officer's report, and thereafter may be followed by the testi-
mony of witnesses called to support the probation officer's
evidence. The defendant is given the opportunity to cross
" Murray v. Swenson, 8upra, n. 50, 231, and Jett v. Superintendent, 209
Md. 633, 640, 120 A. 2d 580 (1956).
60However, probation can be revoked by any judge assigned to the
Criminal Court of Baltimore. CHARTE & P. L. L. or BAL TIomR Ciry
(Flack, 1949), §280.
, See Murray v. Swenson, aupra, n. 50, and People v. Molz, 415 Ill. 183,
113 N. R. 2d 314 (1953), to the effect that mere informalities or irregulari-
ties in the proceedings which do not prejudice the defendant in any manner
may be disregarded.
a Counsel was appointed in a case where the defendant claimed a mental
defect and there existed evidence thereof. The defendant had previously
been released from custody after a hearing of a habeas corpus petition,
alleging an unfair trial for not being represented by counsel. State v. Bray,
Baltimore City Criminal Court, January Term, 1948. See also United States
v. Moore, 101 F. 2d 56 (2nd Cir., 1939).
"337 U. S. 241 (1949).
"201 Md. 25, 92 A. 2d 570 (1952).6 Manning v. United States, 161 F. 2d 827 (5th Cir., 1947).
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examine all witnesses, including the probation officer. After
the "state's case", the defendant may call any witness in
his behalf and/or take the stand in his own defense. The
Court, and in some instances the probation officer, directs
examination of the witnesses. A representative of the
State's Attorney's Office does not participate unless re-
quested to so do by either the Court or the probation
department.
The rules governing a probationer's conduct have been
mentioned before, and the Court must find a violation of
one or more of said rules to hold a defendant guilty of
violating his probation. What amounts to a violation of
these rules is largely a question of fact within the discre-
tion of the trial judge,6" and it has been held that probation
can be revoked on the basis of a probation officer's report.6
In reversing a trial court's finding of a violation of proba-
tion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that such a
finding is reviewable not only as to the abuse of discretion,
but also as to whether an erroneous construction has been
placed by the trial judge on the condition on which the
sentence was suspended.67
If a verdict of not guilty is decided upon, naturally, the
defendant continues on probation; but, if a verdict of guilty
has been decided upon or guilt has been admitted, the
Court may either impose the suspended sentence or, in a
deserving case, continue the defendant on probation. The
Court upon revoking probation may impose, under the
specific authority of Section 279 of the Charter and Public
Local Laws of Baltimore City (Flack, 1949), any sentence
which might have originally been imposed for the crime of
which said probationer was convicted.68 However, it could
be argued that to impose a sentence greater than that which
was originally passed, could in effect subject the defendant
to "double jeopardy".6 9 It is also unresolved whether the
Court could at that point impose a reduced sentence con-
sistent with Rule 744(c) of the Maryland Rules of Practice."
Quaere, what sentence, if any, can be imposed where an
order granting probation before conviction has been re-
voked? Two views on this question are noted, one of them
having held that probation before conviction is tantamount
to a finding of guilty, and it therefore follows that upon its
Swann v. State, 200 Md. 420, 425-6, 90 A. 2d 690 (1952).
People v. McClean, 130 Cal. App. 2d 439, 279 P. 2d 87 (1955).
0 Supra, n. 63.
U Cf. Hite v. State, 198 Md. 602, 607-8, 84 A. 2d 899 (1951).
9 Cf. Pollard v. United States, ... U. S. 77 S. Ct. 481 (1957).
70 Supra, circa, n. 33.
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revocation a sentence can be imposed.7 1 The remaining
view holds that the finding of probation before conviction
does not of itself record any verdict in a criminal case, and
upon revocation a defendant must be retried in a different
proceeding for his original offense before any sentence can
be imposed.72
In conclusion, the foregoing text has outlined the high-
lights of the probationary services of the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore, with some historical background. As a final
note, it should be observed that probation, as heretofore
stated, is a relatively new process for handling the criminal
offender. Treatment philosophy has progressed greatly
since the common-law days of chopping off the hands of
convicted pickpockets, and modern methods seek to pro-
vide earnest social adjustment and control to those in our
community who have strayed from the path of social order.
Presently, at least from the academic point of view, proba-
tion is but a mere fractional phase of the transition from
common-law standards of punishment to the modern day
philosophies of criminologists and sociologists. This should
not be the extent of our progression. Probation points out
a path and direction for future development of the control
and treatment of the malefactor. It should be the responsi-
bility of the legal profession, shared equally with the crimi-
nologist and sociologist, to discover new methods to over-
come a social handicap.
See State v. Palmer, Baltimore City Criminal Court, September Term,
1953, also State v. Stump, Baltimore City Criminal Court, May Term, 1953.
71 See State v. Primeaux, Baltimore City Criminal Court, May Term, 1954.
When a rehearing of the original case is ordered, testimony previously
obtained can be used in lieu of requiring former witnesses to appear, for
in receiving probation before conviction, a defendant agrees in writing to
the use of recorded testimony in subsequent hearings.
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